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Abstract. This paper belongs to the recent literature which explores the consequence(s) of allowing
some player(s) to be minimally honest in the standard Nash implementation. In this literature, Dutta
and Sen(2012) give sufficient conditions for the implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash
equilibria provided at least one individual is partially honest, that is Maskin Monotonicity is no longer
required. They did not present any necessary condition. Thus, in this paper, we seek to fill the gap by
deriving a simple necessary condition called, Partial-Equivalency. This condition allows us to lift the
silence on the implementability of several social choice correspondences where Dutta and Sen’s theorem
(2012) does not give any answer. We apply our result to domains of private good economies with single-
peaked preferences and we give examples of solutions of the problem of fair division that are not partially
honest Nash implementable. We introduce the mild property of citizen sovereignty and we prove that
Partial-Equivalency is not only necessary, but becomes also sufficient. Also, we extend our result to
partially honest environment with incomplete information.
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1 Introduction
Recently, many authors have introduced the concept of honesty in implementation
theory. Matsushima (2008a) was the first who studied the effect of a little honesty
in the conduct of agents on the implementability of social choice correspondences. He
constructed a model in incomplete information and he supposed that the agents have
intrinsic preferences for honesty in the sense that they dislike the idea of lying when it
does not influence their welfare. In other words, when an agent makes a choice between
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an honest strategy and a dishonest one, such that they each reach outcomes that have
the same payoff, the agent plays the honest strategy, defined as the strategy that goes
along with the intention of a central planner.
In his model, Matsushima (2008a) considered a social choice function (SCF) which
assigns to each possible vNM preference profile a lottery over the basic set of outcomes.
He supposed that there is a cost of dishonesty removed from the agents’ utility functions.
This cost is an increasing function of the proportion of dishonest announcements
committed during the game. Matsushima (2008a) proved that if a social choice function
is Bayesian-incentive compatible, then it is fully implementable in iterative dominance.
To achieve this implementability, Matsushima (2008a) considered a detail-free
mechanism in the sense that the planner does not need to know details of the agents’
utility functions or prior belief distributions to design the mechanism. In addition, the
mechanism does involve small fines that are to be imposed on players by the planner
when certain strategies are played. In his framework, Matsushima (2008a) provided
an extraordinary result. However, the fact that the planner would know the incentive
compatibility of an implementable social choice function without the knowledge of
the details on utility functions and priors that are not needed for the design of the
implementing mechanism, is not clear.
To clarify this point, Matsushima (2008b) provided a work in a complete information
setting and he gave a similar result for Nash implementation when players suffer a small
utility loss from lying. He showed that when there are three or more individuals, every
social choice function is implementable in the iterative elimination of strictly dominated
strategies, and hence in Nash equilibrium as long as there is aversion to telling lies
among the agents. Impressively, if this aversion is absent, the mechanism will have a
large multiplicity of Nash equilibria, a multiplicity that disappears the moment even a
slight white-lie aversion comes in and we turn to iteratively undominated equilibrium.
The mechanism is entirely detail-free without any dependence to the form of the social
choice function.
Dutta and Sen (2009,2012) have made a significant contribution that reveals the
consequences of partial honesty for implementation theory. They considered a model
that differs from that of Matsushima by studying the implementability of social
choice correspondences (SCCs), not functions, and assuming Nash equilibrium as
the implementing equilibrium notion, rather than iterative undomination. They also
considered a model that is purely ordinal, not cardinal like the one of Matsushima. This
makes their model very significant to study the implementability of several SCCs and
especially those of the voting problems. They showed that when there are at least three
individuals, the presence of even a single partially honest individual (whose identity is not
known to the planner) can lead to a dramatic increase in the class of Nash implementable
SCCs. In particular, all SCCs satisfying no-veto power can be implemented. This result
is surprising and stands in stark contrast to the classical results of Maskin (1999) who
outlines the fact that Maskin Monotonicity is a necessary condition for an SCC to be Nash
implementable and becomes sufficient together with the no-veto power condition. The
planner here only needs to know that there is at least a partially honest agent without
having any knowledge of its identity. In a domain of strict orders, they also provided
necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation in the two-player case when there
is exactly one partially honest individual and when both individuals are partially honest.
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Dutta and Sen (2009,2012) provided also additional results in a Bayesian setting. They
assumed that there exists a particular agent who is partially honest with a strictly positive
probability and they showed that when there is at least three players participating in the
mechanism, any SCC satisfying no-veto power can be implemented in Bayesian Nash
equilibria.
In a Bayesian environment different to that of Dutta and Sen (2012), Korpela (2012)
assumed that all individuals are partially honest and he showed that any partially
honest Bayesian implementable SCF must satisfy incentive compatibility, and with at
least three agents, any SCF satisfying incentive compatibility and no-veto power can be
implementable in Bayesian equilibria. Holden et al. (2012) considered full implementation
in general environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty.
They showed that with at least two agents and when the separable punishment condition
holds, any SCF can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated
deletion of strictly dominated strategies. Kartik and Tercieux (2012) also studied
the problem of implementation when agents are minimally honest, but in using a bit
different formalization. They provided a necessary and almost sufficient condition for
implementability in a environment where strategies can be costly is given.
Doghmi and Ziad (2013) used weak variant of no-veto power in the many players
case into a complete information setting to implement an SCC in Nash equilibria in the
presence of at least one partially honest player. They provided economic applications in
the domains of single-peaked, single-dipped, and single-plateaued preferences and they
showed that any solution of the problem of fair division satisfying unanimity can be
implemented in Nash equilibria. Thus, they extended the implementability of SCCs from
the monotonic family to the no-monotonic family by a very simple manner.
However, the conditions proposed by Dutta and Sen (2012), and Doghmi and Ziad
(2013) are not necessary and so they are silent about the implementability of very
demanding no-monotonic correspondences that fail to satisfy no-veto power and its weak
versions like strong core correspondence and strong Pareto correspondence in the finite
allocation problems, and the voting rules of Borda, Plurality and Anti-plurality in political
sciences. This, it remained an open question.
To give an answer in closing this gap, Lombardi and Yoshihara (2013) provided
necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation with partially honest agents.
These conditions constitute a useful tool to determine whether or not given social
correspondences can be implemented with partial honesty. However, they were stated
in terms of the existence of some unknown sets as in Moore and Repullo (1990), and
hence these properties are not simple. Thus, Lombardi and Yoshihara (2013) presented,
in analogical way to that of the Sjo¨stro¨m (1991), algorithms for constructing the unknown
sets and testing the (non-)implementability of SCCs. Nevertheless, the conditions of these
algorithms are based on the richness of preference domain (Lemmas 1-2,4, pp.7-8). This
requirement is not checked for the non-unanimous correspondences in some domains
that have the property of private preferences like single-peaked and single-plateaued
preferences in private good economies.
To simplify the checking process, we give in this paper a new necessary condition
relatively easy to check compared to that of Lombardi and Yoshihara (2013) termed,
Partial-Equivalency, and we show that if a SCC F is partially honest implementable,
then F must satisfy the Partial-Equivalency condition. We apply this result to private
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good economies with single-peaked preferences for detecting the possible non partial
honest implementability of several important non-unanimous and non-monotonic SCCs
that do not satisfy neither the no-veto power condition nor its weak variants. We use
the mild requirement of citizen sovereignty, which is trivially checked for many SCCs
in private good economies with single-peaked preferences, and we prove that Partial-
Equivalency is not only necessary, but becomes also sufficient. Also, we show that our
necessary condition remains valid in Bayesian setting. We prove that if an SCC is partial
honesty implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibria, then this correspondence must satisfy
Partial-Equivalency.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce notations
and definitions. In Section 3, we state and prove our main result. In Section 4, we give
applications in the domains of private good economies with single-peaked preferences. In
Section 5, we extend our result to honesty environment with incomplete information. We
conclude by remarks.
2 Notations and definitions
Let A be a set of alternatives, and let N = {1, ..., n} be a set of individuals, with generic
element i. Each individual i is characterized by a preference relation Ri defined over
A, which is a complete, transitive, and reflexive relation in some class <i of admissible
preference relations. Let < = <1 × ... × <n. Let D ⊂ < be a domain. An element
R = (R1, ..., Rn) ∈ D is a preference profile. The relation Ri indicates the individual’s i
preference. For a, b ∈ A, the notation aRib means that the individual i prefers weakly a
to b. The asymmetrical and symmetrical parts of Ri are noted respectively by Pi and ∼i.
A social choice correspondence (SCC) F is a multivalued mapping from < into 2A \ {Ø},
that associates with every R a nonempty subset of A. For all Ri ∈ <i and all a ∈ A, the
lower contour set for agent i at alternative a is noted by: L(a,Ri) = {b ∈ A | aRib}. The
strict lower contour set and the indifference lower contour set are noted respectively by
LS(a,Ri) = {b ∈ A | aPib} and LI(a,Ri) = {b ∈ A | a ∼i b}.
Now, we model an environment for partial honesty. As Dutta and Sen (2009,2012), we
assume that an honest player’s preference for honesty is lexicographic. Let Si = < × Ci
be the set of strategy profiles for a player i , where Ci denotes the other components
of the strategy space ( which depend to individual preferences, social states,...). Let
S = S1 × ... × Sn be a set of strategy profiles. The elements of S are denoted by
s = (s1, ..., sn). For each i ∈ N , and R ∈ D , let τi(R) = {R} × Ci be the set of
truthful messages for agent i. We denote by si ∈ τi(R) a truthful strategy as player i is
reporting the true preference profile. We extend a player’s ordering over A to an ordering
over a strategic space S. This, because the players preference between being honest and
dishonest depends on strategies that the others played and of the outcomes which they
obtained. Let Ri be the preference of player i over S in the preference profile R. The
asymmetrical and symmetrical parts of Ri are noted respectively by Ri and ∼Ri . Let Γ
be a mechanism ( game form) represented by the pair (S, g), where Si = D × Ci and
g : S → A is a payoff function.
Definition 1 A player i is partially honest whenever for all preference profile R ∈ D
and for all (si, s−i), (s′i, s−i) ∈ S,
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(i) If g(si, s−i)Rig(s′i, s−i) and si ∈ τi(R), s′i /∈ τi(R), then (si, s−i) Ri (s′i, s−i).
(ii) In all other cases, (si, s−i) Ri (s′i, s−i) iff g(si, s−i)Rig(s′i, s−i).
A Nash equilibrium of the game (Γ,R) is a vector of strategies s ∈ S such that
for any i, g(s)Rig(bi, s−i), for all bi ∈ Si, i.e., when the other player chooses s−i, the
player i cannot deviate from si. Given N(g,R, S) the set of Nash equilibria of the game
(Γ,R), a mechanism Γ = (S, g) implements a SCC F in Nash equilibria if for all R ∈ D ,
F (R) = g(N(g,R, S)). We say that a SCC F is implementable in Nash equilibria if
there is a mechanism which implements it in these equilibria.
To characterize the SCC that can be Nash implemented in partial honest environment,
Dutta and Sen (2012) used the following properties.
Assumption A: There exists at least one partially honest individual and this fact is
known to the planner. However, the identity of this individual is not known to her.
No-veto power : A SCC F satisfies no-veto power if the following condition holds for
each a and each R ∈ D : if there exists an i ∈ N such that L(a,Rj) = A for each
j ∈ N \ {i}, then a ∈ F (R).
Dutta and Sen (2009,2012) proved that under Assumption A, any SCC satisfying
no-veto power can be implemented in Nash equilibria. To enlarge the family of
monotonic correspondences that are Nash implementable with standard agents to that
of no-monotonic correspondences that are Nash implementable with partially honest
agents in private good economies with single-peaked, single-dipped, and single-plateaued
preferences, Doghmi and Ziad (2013) used the properties of I-weak no-veto power 1 and
unanimity 2 that are weaker variants of no-veto power. They proved that as long as
there are at least three agents participating in the mechanism and Assumption A holds,
any SCC F satisfying I-weak no-veto power and unanimity can be implemented in Nash
equilibria. They exploited these properties as a tool to provide especially their main
result in private good economies with single-peaked, single-plateaued, and single-dipped
preferences by showing that Unanimity alone suffices to implement any solution of the
problem of fair division in the presence of at least one partially honest agent. For the
non-unanimous correspondences, neither this result nor that of Dutta and Sen (2012) can
inform us on the implementability of these solutions. Lombardi and Yoshihara (2013) gave
a full characterization for this topic. They provided necessary and sufficient conditions
and algorithms. The conditions are founded on the existence of unknown sets, and hence
they are not simple as those of Moore and Repullo (1990). The algorithms for constructing
1The I-weak no-veto power property has been initially introduced in Doghmi and Ziad (2012) together
with a strong version of monotonicity to characterize standard Nash implementation. To define it, we
provide the following notion. Indifferent options subset : For any agent’i preference Ri, any alternative
a ∈ F (R), for some c ∈ LI(a,Ri) with c 6= a, we define the indifferent options subset by the subset
I(a, c,Ri) = {b ∈ A\{a, c} s.t. a ∼i b ∼i c}. An SCC F satisfies I-weak no-veto power if for each i ∈ N ,
each R ∈ <, each a ∈ F (R) and some c ∈ LI(a,Ri)\{a}, for R′ ∈ <, b ∈ LS(a,Ri)∪I(a, c,Ri) ⊆ L(b, R′i)
and L(b, R′j) = A for all j ∈ N\{i}, then b ∈ F (R′). Other weak variants of the no-veto power
condition called weak no-veto power and strict weak no-veto power have been provided by Doghmi and
Ziad (2008ab) that, respectively, together with Maskin monotonicity and strict monotonicity, ensure the
implementability of many unanimous SCCs. We precise that there is no relationship between the I-weak
no-veto power, weak no-veto power, and strict weak no-veto power conditions.
2A SCC F satisfies unanimity if for any a ∈ A and any R ∈ D , if for any i ∈ N , L(a,Ri) = A, then
a ∈ F (R).
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the unknown sets are based on the property of richness for preference domain, which fails
to check in private good economies, and hence these algorithms do not apply.
3 Main result
We now present a new necessary condition that a social choice correspondence must satisfy
in order to be Nash implementable in the presence of at least one partially honest agent.
We use this necessary condition, called Partial-Equivalency, to identify various social
choice correspondences that cannot be implemented with partial honesty in a symmetric
information setting, precisely because they fail to satisfy this necessary condition.
Definition 2 (Partial-Equivalency)
A SCC F satisfies Partial-Equivalency if for any R,R′ ∈ D and x ∈ F (R′), if
[R 6= R′ implies for all b ∈ A \ {x}, xP ′i b for all i ∈ N ], then x ∈ F (R′).
This condition stipulates that if an alternative x is socially chosen in a preference
profile R, and if x is the unique maximal element in R′ when at least one agent changes
his preference in groining from R to R′, then x is socially chosen in R′.
To understand better this new necessary condition of Partial Equivalency, we consider
the following example.
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a, b, c, d}. Let R,R′ ∈ D be defined by:
R: R1 R2 R3
b a a
c c,d b,c
a, d b d
R′: R′1 R
′
2 R
′
3
a a a
b,d c,d b,c
c b d
Let F (R) = {a, c} and F (R′) = {a}. In this example, we have a ∈ F (R), and a is
an unique maximal element for all players in R′ when player 1 changes his preference in
going from R to R′, therefore Partial-Equivalency says that a ∈ F (R′).
Since the sufficient conditions provided by Dutta and Sen (2009,2012) and Doghmi
and Ziad (2013) are weak, the gap between a full characterization and these conditions
is very small. Thus, the new necessary condition of Partial-Equivalency is an extremely
weak property.
Observation 1 The properties of no-veto power and unanimity imply partial equivalency.
Proof. Let R,R′ ∈ D , x ∈ A, and x ∈ F (R). Assume that [R 6= R′ implies for all
b ∈ A \ {x}, xP ′i b for all i ∈ N ]. This means that L(x,R′i) = A for all i ∈ N . By
unanimity x ∈ F (R′), and hence partial equivalency is implied by no-veto power. Q.E.D
Now, we present our first result of this paper.
Theorem 1 Let Assumption A hold. If a SCC F is partial honest implementable in Nash
equilibria, then F satisfies Partial-Equivalency.
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Proof. Let F be a Partial honest Nash implementable SCC. Therefore, for all
R ∈ D , F (R) = g(N(g,R, S)). Let x ∈ F (R), by definition of implementability,
x ∈ F (R) = g(N(g,R, S)), means that there exists s ∈ N(g,R, S) such that g(s) = x.
Suppose that F does not satisfy Partial-Equivalency. Therefore, if for any R,R′ ∈ D and
x ∈ F (R′), if
[R 6= R′ implies for all b ∈ A \ {x}, xP ′i b for all i ∈ N ] (1), but x /∈ F (R′). By
implementability, x /∈ F (R′) = g(N(g,R′ , S)) implies that s /∈ N(g,R′ , S). Therefore,
there exists a player k with a strategy s˜k such that (s˜k, s−k) R′k (sk, s−k) (2). By
Assumption A there is at least one partially honest player, denoted h. Thus, the deviator
player k can be the agent h, i.e. k = h or he is different to h, i.e., k 6= h.
α) If k = h, then, since s is not a Nash equilibrium at R′, the partially honest
agent h can deviate to the truthful announcement of R′, i.e., for any sh /∈ τh(R′), there
exists s˜h ∈ τh(R′) such that (s˜h, s−h) R′h (sh, s−h) (3). Assume that g(s˜h, s−h) = b,
g(sh, s−h) = x, it follows from (1) that b = g(s˜h, s−h)R′hx implies that R = R
′. From (3),
we obtain (s˜h, s−h) Rh (sh, s−h). Therefore, s /∈ N(g,R, S), a contradiction.
β) If k 6= h, i.e., the agent k is not partially honest, then by definition, the relation
(2) is equivalent to g(s˜k, s−k)P ′kg(sk, s−k). Assume that g(s˜k, s−k) = b, g(sk, s−k) = x,
it follows from (1) that b = g(s˜k, s−h)P ′kx implies that R = R
′. From (2), we obtain
(s˜k, s−k) Rk (sk, s−k). Therefore, s /∈ N(g,R, S), a contradiction. Q.E.D.
In the next section, we use the result of Theorem 1 to study the implementability of
some non-monotonic correspondences which violate unanimity in the domain of private
good economies with single-peaked preferences.
4 Applications to private good economies with single-
peaked preferences
In the following subsections, we present the private good economies model with single-
peaked preferences, introduce some well-known correspondences, and study the problem
of their implementability.
4.1 The economic environment
There is an amount Ω ∈ R++ of a certain infinitely divisible good that is to be allocated
among a set N = {1, ..., n} of n agents. The preference of each agent i ∈ N is represented
by a continuous and single-peaked preference relation Ri over [0,Ω]
3: This means that
there is a number p(Ri) such that for all xi, yi ∈ [0,Ω]: (i) if yi < xi ≤ p(Ri) or
p(Ri) ≤ xi < yi, then xiPiyi. We call p(Ri) the peak of Ri.
The class of all single-peaked preference relations is represented by <spi ⊆ <i. Let
<sp = <sp1 × ... × <spn be the domain of single-peaked preferences. For R ∈ <sp, let
3For all xi, yi ∈ [0,Ω], xiRiyi means that, for the agent i, to consume a share xi is as good as to
consume the quantity yi. The asymmetrical and symmetrical parts of Ri are written respectively Pi and
∼i.
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p(R) = (p(R1), ..., p(Rn)) be the profile of peaks (or of preferred consumptions). A single-
peaked preference relation Ri ∈ Dspi is described by the function ri : [0,Ω]→ [0,Ω] which
is defined as follows: ri(xi) is the consumption of the agent i on the other side of the
peak which is indifferent to xi (if it exists), or else, it is 0 or Ω; i.e., if xi ≤ p(Ri),
then, ri(xi) ≥ p(Ri) and xi ∼i ri(xi) if such a number exists or ri(xi) = Ω otherwise; if
xi ≥ p(Ri), then, ri(xi) ≤ p(Ri) and xi ∼i ri(xi) if such a number exists or ri(xi) = 0
otherwise.
For R ∈ <sp, a feasible allocation for the economy (R,Ω) is a vector x ≡ (xi)i∈N ∈ Rn+
such that
∑
i∈N xi = Ω and X is the set of the feasible allocations. We note that the
feasible allocations set is X ⊆ [0,Ω] × ... × [0,Ω]. Thus, L(x,Ri) = X is equivalent to
L(xi, Ri) = [0,Ω]. For the set L(x,Ri) = X, xRiy for all y ∈ X implies that xiRiyi.
Thus, the agents preferences are defined over individual consumption spaces, not over
allocation space. Then the properties of implementation theory, presented in general
setup in Section 2, become as follows. An SCC F is a multi-valued mapping from <sp
into X. A SCC F satisfies Partial-Equivalency if for R,R′ ∈ D , x ∈ F (R), if Ri = R′i
and, R−i 6= R′−i implies for all y ∈ X \ {x}, xjP ′jyj for all j ∈ N \ {i}, then x ∈ F (R′).
We note that the free disposability of the good is not assumed.
In the next subsection, we study the implementability of some examples of the
solutions of the problem of fair division.
4.2 Examples of correspondences violate Maskin monotonicity,
unanimity, and partial equivalency
Here we firstly provide some solutions of the problem of fair division, and we secondly
inspect their implementability in the standards setting and in the partially honest
environment.
4.2.1 Egalitarian-Equivalence correspondence from equal division(EEed)
The egalitarian-equivalence correspondence from equal division is a solution adapted from
a notion proposed by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) for the fair division problem. An
allocation x is said to be egalitarian-equivalence correspondence from equal division if
there is a bundle z = (Ω
n
, ..., Ω
n
) so that for all i ∈ N , xi ∼i Ωn ; such a vector z is called an
egalitarian-reference-bundle.
Proposition 1 In private good economies with single-peaked preferences, the EEed
correspondence does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity.
Proof. Let R,R′ ∈ Dsp, N = {1, 2, 3}, x = (2, 1, 9) ∈ X with
∑3
i=1 xi = Ω = 12. Let
p(R) = (2.75, 2.5, 6), and p(R′) = (2, 1, 9). Figure 1 illustrates such representations.
Note that x ∈ EEed(R) and for all i ∈ N , L(xi, Ri) ⊆ L(xi, R′i). However, in profile
R′, x /∈ EEed(R′).Q.E.D.
As an immediate corollary of Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 of Maskin (1999), we have
the following result.
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Figure 1: The EEed correspondence does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity, unanimity, or
partial equivalency.
Corollary 1 In private good economies, if the preferences are single-peaked, the EEed
correspondence can not be implemented in Nash equilibria with standard agents.
Proposition 2 In private good economies with single-peaked preferences, the EEed
correspondence does not satisfy unanimity.
Proof. It follows from Figure 1 that, in profile R′, L(xi, R′i) = [0,Ω] for all i ∈ N , but
x /∈ EEed(R′).Q.E.D.
From Proposition 2, we conclude that Theorem 1 of Doghmi and Ziad (2013)
and the results of Lombardi and Yoshihara (2013) can not give us an answer on the
implementability of the EEed correspondence. To examine its implementation, we use
Theorem 1. We give the following result.
Proposition 3 In private good economies with single-peaked preferences, the EEed
correspondence does not satisfy Partial-Equivalency.
Proof. It follows from Figure 1 that x ∈ EEed(R), and R 6= R′ implies that xi is the
unique maximal element in R′, but x /∈ EEed(R′).Q.E.D.
Corollary 2 In private good economies, if the preferences are single-peaked, the the EEed
correspondence can not be implemented in Nash equilibria with partially honest agents.
4.2.2 Pareto Indifferent (PI)
Two allocations x, y ∈ X are Pareto indifferent under R if xi ∼i yi for all i ∈ N . This
solution fail to satisfy Maskin monotonicity as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 In private good economies with single-peaked preferences, the PI correspondence
does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity.
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Figure 2: The PI correspondence does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity, unanimity, or
partial equivalency.
Proof. Let R,R′ ∈ Dsp, N = {1, 2, 3}, x = (1, 4, 7), y = (3, 5, 4) ∈ X with∑3
i=1 xi = Ω = 12. Let p(R) = (2, 4.5, 6), and p(R
′) = (1, 4, 7). Figure 2 illustrates
such representations.
Note that x ∈ PI(R) and for all i ∈ N , L(xi, Ri) ⊆ L(xi, R′i). However, in profile R′,
x /∈ PI(R′).Q.E.D.
Corollary 3 In private good economies, if the preferences are single-peaked, the PI
correspondence can not be implemented in Nash equilibria with standard agents.
Proposition 5 In private good economies with single-peaked preferences, the PI correspondence
does not satisfy unanimity.
Proof. It follows from Figure 2 that L(xi, R
′) = [0,Ω] for i = 1, 2, 3, but x /∈
PI(R′).Q.E.D.
Proposition 6 In private good economies with single-peaked preferences, the PI correspondence
does not satisfy Partial-Equivalency.
Proof. It follows from Figure 2 that x ∈ PI(R), and R 6= R′ implies that xi is the
unique maximal element in R′, but x /∈ PI(R′).Q.E.D.
Corollary 4 In private good economies, if the preferences are single-peaked, the PI
correspondence can not be implemented in Nash equilibria with partially honest agents.
A third non-monotonic and non-unanimous solution can be produced from the
intersection of the EEed correspondence and the PI correspondence. Thus, from
Propositions 1, 3, 4, and 6, we give the following result.
Corollary 5 In private good economies, if the preferences are single-peaked, the EEed ∩
PI correspondence can not be implemented in Nash equilibria neither with standards
agents nor with partially honest ones.
Others examples of solutions can be constructed by intersection with the above
correspondences and they can be studied in others specific domains restrictions like single-
peaked preferences with worst indifferent allocations, and single-troughed preferences.
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4.3 Partial-Equivalency and full characterization
In this subsection, we prove that Partial-Equivalency is not only necessary, but becomes
also sufficient in private good economies with single-peaked preferences. To show this, we
introduce the mild requirement of citizen sovereignty that is trivially checked for many
solutions including those which violate the property of unanimity in this area..
Definition 3 (Citizen sovereignty)
A SCC F satisfies the property of citizen sovereignty if for each x ∈ X, there is a profile
R ∈ Dsp such that x ∈ F (R).
In the next proposition, we prove that in private good economies with single-peaked
preferences, if the property of citizen sovereignty holds, any partially-equivalence SCC is
unanimous.
Lemma 1 In the private good economies with single-peaked preferences, if the property
of citizen sovereignty holds, then any partially-equivalence SCC satisfies unanimity.
Proof. Suppose not. Let x ∈ X and R˜ ∈ Dsp be such that for any i ∈ N ,
[0,Ω] = L(xi, R˜i), and x /∈ F (R˜). By the property of citizen sovereignty, for all x ∈ X,
there is a profile R ∈ Dsp such that x ∈ F (R). Therefore, R˜ 6= R. Since L(xi, R˜i) = [0,Ω]
for all i ∈ N at R˜, it follows from single-peakedness that for all i ∈ N , xiP˜iyi for all
y ∈ X \ {x}. By Partial-Equivalency, x ∈ F (R˜), a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Through Observation 1 and Lemma 1 we complete the proof of the following
proposition.
Proposition 7 In the private good economies with single-peaked preferences, if the
requirement of citizen sovereignty holds, an SCC satisfies unanimity if and only if it
is partially-equivalence.
Through Proposition 7 and Theorem 1 of Doghmi and Ziad (2013), we complete the
proof of the second main Theorem of the paper.
Theorem 2 : Let n ≥ 3. In the private good economies with single-peaked preferences,
if the requirement of citizen sovereignty holds, an SCC is partially honest Nash
implementable if and only if it satisfies Partial-Equivalency.
According to Diss, Doghmi and Tliti (2015), this result give an important connection
with strategy-proofness, which is considered as a central property in implementation
theory. It is a necessary condition for dominant strategy implementation in general
environment, and it is also a necessary property for Nash implementation in private good
economies with single-plateaued preferences as shown in Doghmi and Ziad (2015), and
hence when preferences are single-peaked. Diss, Doghmi and Tliti (2015) proved that,
under some requirements and when the welfare of a society is represented by a single-
valued function, strategy-proofness is a necessary and sufficient condition for partially
honest Nash implementation, standard Nash implementation, and dominant strategy
implementation, and they concluded that these theories become equivalent.
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5 Partially honest environment with incomplete information
To complement Dutta and Sen’s result for sufficiency in incomplete information setting,
we offer our second main result in this paper for necessity. For this, we reconsider Dutta
and sen’s model in this environment. Let j a particular partially honest agent with
probability  > 0 and self-interested with probability 1 − . The N \ {j} agents are
self-interested. As in section 2, we consider the mechanism Γ = (S, g) where S is a
product strategy set and g : S → A. Also, we assume that Si = D ×Ci where Ci denotes
other components of agent i’s strategy space. Let R ∈ D . We assume that there is an
individual j with two types: a truthful type denoted t and self-interested type denoted
m. The N \{j} individuals have a single type m. The action set for individual i is Si. As
in Definition 1, individual j of type t has preferences over S in the preference profile R
denoted by R. All individuals of type m have preferences over lotteries with outcomes
in A. Let l be an arbitrary individual of type m. Let the mapping υ : A → < be an
utility function which represents Rl. This function satisfies the following requirement.
For all x, y ∈ A, xPy ⇔ υ(x) > υ(x) and x ∼ y ⇔ υ(x) = υ(x). Let p = {px}, x ∈ A
be a lottery over elements of A with p(x) ≥ 0 and ∑x∈A px = 1. We say that for a
individual l, a lottery p is at least as good as a lottery p′ according to cardinal function
υ, denoted by pRυl p
′, if
∑
x∈A υ(x)px ≥
∑
x∈A υ(x)p
′
x. Let υl be a cardinalization Rl for
all l ∈ N . The individual j has two strategies stj, smj ∈ Sj. An individual l 6= j has a
strategy sl ∈ Sl.
A strategy profile ((stj, s
m
j ), s−j) is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (BNE) if
α) Γ(stj, s−j) Rj Γ(sj, s−j) for all sj ∈ Sj;
β) Γ(smj , s−j)RjΓ(sj, s−j) for all sj ∈ Sj;
γ) υl(Γ(s
t
j, sl, s−l,j))+υl(Γ(s
m
j , sl, s−l,j))(1−) ≥ υi(Γ(stj, sl, s−l,j))+υl(Γ(smj , sl, s−l,j))(1−
) for all sl ∈ Sl and all l 6= j.
Let R ∈ D . We define by the pair (Γ, R) a game of incomplete information where Γ
is a ordinal mechanism as in Dutta and Sen (2009,2012). Thus, the set of equilibria does
not depend on the chosen cardinalization. We say that Γ implements a SCC F if, for all
R ∈ D ,
a) For all a ∈ F (R), there exists a BNE of the game (Γ, R) denoted by ((stj, smj ), s−j)
such that g(stj, s−j) = g(s
m
j , s−j) = a.
b) Let ((stj, s
m
j ), s−j) be an arbitrary BNE of (Γ, R). Then g(s
t
j, s−j), g(s
m
j , s−j) ∈ F (R).
The next theorem shows that a SCC which is partial honesty implementable in
Bayesian Nash equilibria must satisfy Partial-Equivalency.
Theorem 3 If a SCC F is partial honest implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibria,
then F satisfies Partial-Equivalency.
Proof. Let F a SCC Partial honest implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibria.
Therefore, for all R ∈ D ,
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a) For all x ∈ F (R), there exists a BNE of the game Γ, R) denoted by ((stj, smj ), s−j) such
that g(stj, s−j) = g(s
m
j , s−j) = x.
b) Let ((stj, s
m
j ), s−j) be an arbitrary BNE of (Γ, R). Then g(s
t
j, s−j), g(s
m
j , s−j) ∈ F (R).
Suppose that F does not satisfy Partial-Equivalency. Therefore, for R,R′ ∈ D , x ∈ F (R),
we have [R 6= R′ implies for all b ∈ A \ {x}, xP ′i b for all i ∈ N ] (1), but x /∈ F (R′). By
implementability, the strategy ((stj, s
m
j ), s−j) is not a BNE of (Γ, R
′). Therefore, there
exists a player k with a strategy sk ∈ Sk such that (α′) Γ(sk, s−k) R′k Γ(stk, s−k) for
some sk ∈ Sk or (β′) Γ(sk, s−k)P ′kΓ(smk , s−k) for some sk ∈ Sk or (γ′) For the cardinal
function υl which represents R
′
l, we have υl(Γ(s
t
k, sl, s−l,k))+ υl(Γ(s
m
k , sl, s−l,k))(1− ) >
υl(Γ(s
t
k, sl, s−l,k))+ υl(Γ(s
m
k , sl, s−l,k))(1− ) for some sl ∈ Sl and l 6= k. By Assumption
A there is at least one partially honest player, denoted h. Thus, the deviator player k
can be the agent h, i.e. k = h or he is different to h, i.e., k 6= h.
Case.1) If k = h, then for possibility α′ we have the following: since s is not
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium at R′, the partially honest agent h can deviate to the
truthful announcement of R′, i.e., for any sth /∈ τh(R′), there exists sh ∈ τh(R′) such
that Γ(sh, s−h) R′h Γ(sth, s−h) (2). Assume that g(sh, s−h) = b and g(sth, s−h) = x,
then it follows from implication (1) that b = g(sh, s−h)R′hg(s
t
h, s−h) = x implies that
R = R′. From (2), we obtain Γ(sh, s−h) Rh Γ(sth, s−h). For β′, it follows from (1) that
Γ(sh, s−h)PhΓ(smh , s−h) (3). For possibility γ
′, assume that l ∈ N \ {h} is an arbitrary
player of type m. Let υl be the cardinal function which represents Rl. Since  > 0,
it follows from (2) and (3) that for some sh ∈ Sh and l 6= h, υl(Γ(sth, sl, s−l,h)) +
υl(Γ(s
m
h , sl, s−l,h))(1 − ) > υl(Γ(sth, sl, s−l,h)) + υl(Γ(smh , sl, s−l,h))(1 − ) (4). From
(2),(3), and (4), we conclude that the strategy ((sth, s
m
h ), s−h) is not a BNE of (Γ, R),
a contradiction.
Case.2) If k 6= h, i.e., the agent k is not partially honest, then by definition, the
relations (α′) and (β′) are equivalent. Assume that g(sk, s−k) = b and g(stk, s−k) = x,
then from implication (1) it follows that b = g(sk, s−k)P ′kg(s
t
k, s−k) = x implies
that R = R′. Thus, the the relations (α′) and (β′) respectively become as follows:
Γ(sk, s−k) Rk Γ(stk, s−k) for some sk ∈ Sk (5), Γ(sk, s−k)PkΓ(smk , s−k) for some sk ∈ Sk
(6). For possibility γ′, assume that l ∈ N \ {k} is an arbitrary player of type m. Let
υl be the cardinal function which represents Rl. Since  > 0, it follows from (5) and
(6) that for some sk ∈ Sk and l 6= k, υl(Γ(stk, sl, s−l,k)) + υl(Γ(smk , sl, s−l,k))(1 − ) >
υl(Γ(s
t
k, sl, s−l,k))+υl(Γ(s
m
k , sl, s−l,k))(1− ) (7). From (5),(6), and (7), we conclude that
the strategy ((sth, s
m
h ), s−h) is not a BNE of (Γ, R), a contradiction. Q.E.D.
6 Concluding remarks
We have contributed to the growing literature on Nash implementation with partially
honest agents by deriving a simple necessary condition, called Partial-Equivalency, that
a social choice correspondence must satisfy in order to be Nash implementable in the
presence of a partially honest agent. We have then used this necessary condition to
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identify various social choice correspondences that cannot be implemented in the presence
of a partially honest agent were the results of Dutta and Sen (2009,2012) and Doghmi
and Ziad (2013) do not give any answer.
We have given application in the domain of private good economies with single-peaked
preferences. We have provided examples of non-monotonic solutions of the problem
of fair division which violate unanimity. We have shown that they are not partially
honest Nash implementable. We have have introduced the mild requirement of citizen
sovereignty and we have proved that Partial-Equivalency becomes sufficient for partially
honest implementation. We have also extended our result to the case where there exists
a particular agent who is partially honest with a strictly positive probability.
We conclude that even if Dutta and Sen (2009,2012) have made a significant
contribution that reveals the ramifications of partial honesty for implementation theory
by dropping Maskin monotonicity, it remains again many very demanding social rules
that can not be implemented in this domain of partial honesty. However, the honesty
of players can be modeled in others ways and so it is therefore possible to capture
the implementability of the family of choice rules considered in this paper and the
implementability of others social choice rules that can be constructed by developing
certain specific combinations. This is a fruitful area which we leave for future research.
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